Court Rules Company's Website Violates Americans with Disabilities Act

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In what is the first lawsuit of this kind that I have heard of to go to trial, a Florida federal court has ruled in favor of a blind man who has filed nearly 70 lawsuits alleging that various companies’ websites violate the Americans with Disabilities Act.

On June 12, Judge Robert Scola, of the Southern District of Florida, decided that Winn-Dixie’s website is heavily integrated with the company’s physical store locations, making it subject to the ADA. His decision will require the company to update its site.

Plaintiff Juan Carlos Gil won't receive damages but the company will have to rebuild its website to comply with the court's order. The company has set aside $250,000 to update the site, though testimony during the trial indicated it will not cost nearly that much. During the trial experts estimated it would cost less than $37,000 for the company to update its site

The court ordered the company to comply with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0 Level AA drafted by accessibility experts. Experts consider this to be the de facto standard for website accessibility.

Gil can’t see the screen of his computer but uses JAWS or other screen reader software that tells him the details of the site he is visiting. When he hits the tab and shift buttons, it tells him what he needs to type. He uses the Winn-Dixie site to buy groceries and prescription drugs. He wants to use the websites to find coupons and refill prescriptions. 

One of the main questions the court had to decide was whether the website is a “place of public accommodation” under the ADA. The court ruled that because the site is “heavily integrated” with Winn-Dixie’s stores, it is.

The Court wrote:

“Although Winn-Dixie argues that Gil has not been denied access to Winn-Dixie’s physical store locations as a result of the inaccessibility of the website, the ADA does not merely require physical access to a place of public accommodation. Rather, the ADA requires that disabled individuals be provided ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.’”

This case indicates that companies which have a website that is a large portion of a customer's experience (think Amazon, Wal-Mart, etc.) will need to make sure their websites are accessible for those who are blind or risk a lawsuit similar to this one. 

Read more about this case. 

Backlash Against Remote Working as Companies Order Employees Back to the Office

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An IBM-convened panel at SIOP 2017 explored the benefits and challenges of remote working. With perspectives from academia as well as public and private sectors, the consistent message was that teleworking works, and that associated challenges can be managed with careful planning and communication.

Apparently IBM doesn't believe its own research.

Last week thousands of IBM employees — roughly 40 percent of the total 380,000 workforce — were given an ultimatum. They must either relocate to a regional office or leave the company. This will be a substantial hardship for many of those employees because they may live hundreds of miles from the nearest regional office. 

IBM's move is part of a growing trend among larger tech companies that are rethinking telework. Within the last several years Best Buy and Yahoo both ended or severely restricted their telework programs.

The fact that Yahoo and IBM have made this move is pretty surprising to me. Most research on the subject indicates that teleworking, when handled correctly, works. In fact it works better than working in the office for many. The true enemy of deep, substantive work is often the office environment itself. Meetings, office chit chat, and all the distractions that find their way to your office or cubicle are the real enemies of work. 

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Here is an interesting article from remote work proponent Jason Fried discussing why he thinks companies like Yahoo are making a mistake by eliminating remote work options. Put simply, if you hire quality people who are interested in doing meaningful work, then remote working is a great option. If remote working is not working in your organization, then it likely indicates a problem with the type of people you are hiring or in the structure of your organization itself. 

Perhaps these companies that are ending remote work programs are mistakenly addressing a symptom of a larger problem within their organizations.  

Jury awards $769,000 Against Washington University in Disability Discrimination Case

A St. Louis woman has won a $769,000 verdict against Washington University in a trial alleging the school refused to accommodate her disability and then fired her.

The plaintiff, age 55, worked as a researcher at the university's medical school from 1996 to 2012 and had herniated disks, according to her lawsuit. She claimed her back problems caused her extreme pain in certain positions "including but not limited to cell culture and bench work" and that the university and her supervisor discriminated against her by not accommodating her condition.

Her lawyer said the university in November 2012 fired her from her cancer research position, telling her the school had lost funding for her projects. Her lawsuit said her firing was in retaliation for her request that she not be required to sit and bend over for excessive periods of time.

After a five-day trial in St. Louis Circuit Court, the jury Friday awarded Lin $269,000 in actual damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.

It should be noted that St. Louis is seen by many as being one of the most plaintiff-friendly venues in the country so your mileage may vary. 

Read the story here.

 

 

$51 Million Dollar Verdict Awarded in Age Discrimination Case

A former Lockheed Martin engineer, who sued for age discrimination after being laid off at age 66, was awarded $51.6 million by a jury in a federal court in New Jersey. This may be the highest amount ever awarded to an individual in an age discrimination case, and stands as a stark reminder that age discrimination remains a big — and potentially very expensive — issue for HR.

Robert Braden was a mid-level manager who spent almost 29 years at a Lockheed Martin facility in Moorestown, NJ. He claims that he was a target in a reduction in force plan to replace older workers with younger ones, and that he and other older workers consistently received less pay and lower reviews and raises than younger workers.

In his lawsuit complaint, Braden said that he was the oldest of six engineers in Lockheed's Electronic Systems-Mission Systems and Sensors unit, that his title was project specialist, senior staff, and that he was the only one let go in that round of layoffs. He said that he was given no specific reason for his termination and that his job performance had been "excellent." He also said that supervisors and company executives regularly made remarks about older workers.

The $51.6 award breaks down like this:

  • $50 million for punitive damages under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,

  • $520,000 for economic loss,

  • $520,000 for willful action against the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA) and

  • another $520,000 for pain and suffering.

(Note that in Texas, the size of the this verdict would have been greatly reduced by the application of damages caps passed by the Texas legislature to protect companies who commit this type of wrongful conduct.)

Discrimination against older workers remains a significant problem

While the size of the Lockheed verdict is certainly surprising, workplace age discrimination, unfortunately, is not. A 2013 AARP study found that almost two in three workers ages 45 to 74 said they have experienced workplace age discrimination.

And with an aging US population and ongoing economic uncertainty, more people plan to or must stay in the workforce well past the age of 65. As a result, managers and supervisors should take steps to ensure all employees are vigilant and sensitive to behavior and practices that can be grounds for an age discrimination claim.

Don't Sign Away Your Right to Get a New Job

The growth of noncompete agreements is part of a broad shift in which companies assert ownership over work experience as well as work. A recent survey by economists including Evan Starr, a management professor at the University of Maryland, showed that about one in five employees was bound by a noncompete clause in 2014.

Employment lawyers say their use has exploded. Another recent study showed that noncompete and trade-secret lawsuits had roughly tripled since 2000. Noncompete agreements are not being used beyond the realm of protecting truly proprietary information.  They are being used, and arguably abused, by companies of all types against employees at all levels. 

Employment lawyers know this, but workers are often astonished to learn that they’ve signed away their right to leave for a competitor. A recent article in the New York Times tells the story of Timothy Gonzalez, an hourly laborer who shoveled dirt for a fast-food-level wage, was sued after leaving one environmental drilling company for another.

By giving companies huge power to dictate where and for whom their employees can work next, noncompetes take a person’s greatest professional assets — years of hard work and earned skills — and turn them into a liability.

Read the entire New York Times Story

 

Can You Trust Your Company's HR Department?

A fellow blogger has a post out this week titled "Who Do You Report Harassment To If the Harasser Is the CEO?".  It is a thoughtful article and it makes the excellent point that HR for every company needs to bake into their policies a method by which an employee can internally report sexual harassment being committed by the CEO or owner of a company without risk of retaliation. I think that is an excellent goal to strive for and I hope that all HR departments set that as a goal.  There is only one problem with the premise of the article. 

The effort will almost certainly fail. 

Michael Corleone: "C'mon Frankie... my father did business with HR, he respected HR."

Frank Pentangeli: "Your father did business with HR, he respected HR... but he never trusted HR!"

 

 

HR is, in my opinion, possibly the most challenging role for any manager to do and do well. It is arguably designed to fail. The problem is obvious: HR serves two masters. On the one hand, HR is designed to serve as a helpful ombudsman to employees. To assist employees who are being mistreated. To conduct thorough investigations and correct inappropriate behavior against employees. On the other hand, HR is required to defend management against accusations of unlawful employment practices. HR is usually directly involved in the termination decisions that lead to EEOC filings. HR is then in charge of or at least heavily involved in drafting the company's defensive statement of position filings, arguing that the company is blameless. Thus, the very department that an employee is supposed to trust with his or her career and feel comfortable making a complaint to is the same department that will be spearheading the fight against the employee when it all goes south. 

What this means in most companies is that, no, you cannot trust HR to help you. While many HR officers have their hearts in the right place when they start working in the field, they can't help but know who is responsible for signing their paychecks. Hint: it's not the employee bringing a complaint against a member of management.  

So, should you bring complaints to HR? Yes, you should. In fact, in many cases you are legally required to do so or you risk waiving any claims you may have against the company for the discrimination or harassment you are reporting. Just don't assume that HR's only role is to help you. Because it isn't. While HR may be trying to assist you they are also assessing corporate risk, documenting your complaint in a way that will assist the company in defending against your complaint, and looking for ways to satisfy the demands of management. 

Here are a couple of quick tips: 

  1. Make all reports in writing. When push comes to shove down the road, HR is liable to either not "remember" you made a complaint or to remember it substantially differently than you do. Putting your report in writing is the only way to prove you made a complaint, when you made it, and to whom the complaint was made.

  2. You know that written report from number 1, above? KEEP A COPY. A written complaint does you know good if you send the only copy to HR. It might...you know...get lost.

  3. Consider going outside the organization to the EEOC. If your complaint involves EEO-based (age, sex, race, religion disability, color) discrimination or harassment then consider making a complaint to the EEOC sooner rather than later. There will be little question that a report to the EEOC is protected activity under the law. This gives you a somewhat higher level of protection from retaliation than if you merely report internally.

  4. Consult with an employment lawyer. If you are in a situation in which you feel you need to make a complaint against management then, make no mistake, you job IS at risk. Start looking for a qualified employment attorney who represents employees. Be warned, in many parts of the country there aren't that many who lawyers who specialize in representing employees. So start looking before you need one. And don't expect such a lawyer to visit with you for free. This is not a simple car accident case and you aren't looking for a PI lawyer who can take your case on a contingent fee basis. Employment law is very specialized and contingency fees are generally not available for consulting services. If you find a qualified lawyer to advise you, however, it is money well spent.

Bottom line: Yes, you should report harassment or discrimination internally to your company's HR department. But that doesn't mean you should blindly trust the HR department. Understand that they serve two masters and protect yourself accordingly.  

Tip Pool Violations and Other Forms of Wage Theft Common in the Restaurant Industry

Restaurant Workers Are Often Victims of Wage Theft

Restaurant Workers Are Often Victims of Wage Theft

The Wall Street Journal recently reported that wage lawsuits against restaurants have proliferated in troubling and damaging numbers:

“…The number of wage-violation lawsuits has been on the rise for more than a decade, driven by a successful worker-organization movement, increased attention by plaintiffs’ attorneys and complicated labor laws that leave some employers confused, according to legal analysts and industry leaders.

Nationwide, these lawsuits have doubled in the last 10 years in federal courts. In Texas, the number of overtime lawsuits and settlements continues to increase as well. The US Department of Labor recently reported that its wage and hour division found violations in 95 percent of its investigations of Austin-area restaurants between Oct. 1, 2015 and June 30, 2016. 

So why do the vast majority of restaurant employers continue to violate wage laws despite news reports of DOL investigations and lawsuits? 

Read more about overtime claims by restaurant workers.

Does Judge Gorsuch Really Love the Jury Trial?

National Employment Lawyers Association Opposes Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Supreme Court

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In our current environment of a new scandal every five minutes, it is easy for really important issues to get lost in all the noise.  One such big issue currently pending is the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Some oppose Gorsuch's nomination not for anything he has said or done himself, but because of the hotly contested and partisan manner in which his potential seat on the Court was arguably stolen from an equally qualified candidate by certain members of Congress last year. I personally think it was a big mistake for the republicans to inject even more partisan politics into the manner in which Supreme Court justices are selected. In our system of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court's power comes solely from its credibility with the American people. The more partisan the Court looks, the weaker it becomes.  Regardless of one's position on the issues the Court decides, it is in all of our interests for the Court to be respected and considered to be above politics to the greatest degree possible. 

Putting that issue aside for the moment, organizations that typically vet Supreme Court candidates are starting to come in with their assessments of him on issues that are important to said organizations' memberships.  This week the National Employment Lawyers Association announced their opposition to Mr. Gorsuch. NELA is the largest organization of U.S. attorneys who primarily represent employees. 

NELA's letter in opposition to Mr. Gorsuch, the text of which I include in full below, gives several reasons for the organization's opposition to his appointment. However, the most important reason listed, to my mind, is Mr. Gorsuch's reported antipathy for the jury trial...at least in employment cases. 

There have been several news reports over the course of the preceding few weeks touting Mr. Gorsuch's love of the jury trial and his plan to bring it back. Others have discussed Gorsuch's antipathy for the McDonnell-Douglass burden shifting framework in employment cases (an optional but usually-used framework for analyzing employment-related claims frequently used by judges to dismiss discrimination and harassment cases without a trial). On the surface both of these positions seem to align with the interests of employees. I hope that Gorsuch's statements regarding these issues are genuine and would support his efforts in this regard. 

But what NELA points out is that Judge Gorsuch, like many federal judges, has gotten into the bad habit of doing the jury's work for them in far to many cases. Rather than denying motions for summary judgment whenever there is a fact question at issue to be decided by a jury, he all to often weighs the evidence, draws inferences against the employee, and decides the credibility of the witnesses in the case -- all issues that are supposed to be left to the wisdom of the jury. 

Judge Gorsuch is, sadly, not unique in these reported failings. Federal judges overstepping their Constitutional role in employment cases to make improper fact determinations is a well-known problem throughout the country. (Read: "When it comes to employment cases, judges are killing the Civil Rights Act of 1964" by Judge Richard Kopf as well as "Anti-Discrimination Laws Have Been "Gutted"" on this blog.) It is a serious problem that threatens one of the most sacred elements of the American system -- the Constitutional right to a trial by jury. 

The following is the full text of NELA's letter in opposition to Judge Gorsuch's nomination: 

March 13, 2017

Submitted Via Email:
Ted_lehman@judiciary-rep.senate.gov
Paige_herwig@judiciary-dem.senate.gov

The Honorable Chuck Grassley, Chairman
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
224 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
152 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Grassley and Ranking Member Feinstein:

On behalf of the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), and its 4,000 circuit, state, and local affiliate members across the country, I write to express our strong opposition to the nomination of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch to the United States Supreme Court.

NELA is the largest professional membership organization in the country comprising lawyers who represent workers in labor, employment and civil rights disputes. Founded in 1985, NELA advances employee rights and serves lawyers who advocate for equality and justice in the American workplace. Our members litigate daily in every circuit, affording NELA a unique perspective on how employment cases actually play out on the ground. NELA strives to protect the rights of its members’ clients, and envisions a workplace in which employees will be paid at least a living wage in an environment free of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and capricious employment decisions; employees’ safety and livelihood will not be compromised for the sake of corporate profit and interests; and individuals will have effective legal representation to enforce their rights to a fair and just workplace, adequate remedies, and a right to trial by jury.

As a member of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Gorsuch has demonstrated a troubling propensity to both draw inferences against plaintiff-employees and make improper determinations regarding the credibility of the respective parties when deciding whether an employee should be permitted to present her claims to a jury (the procedural posture in most employment cases on appeal). This practice runs afoul of the applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rulings from the Supreme Court. Judge Gorsuch has shown an affinity for deploying legal reasoning unsupported by the text and purposes of the particular employment laws at issue, and adopting inappropriately narrow readings of both the facts and law in ways that operate to the detriment of employees seeking to vindicate their statutory rights. This pattern gives rise to the question of whether Judge Gorsuch places the interests of employers over the rights of employees, which should be fully explored during his confirmation hearing.

Judge Gorsuch’s tendencies as described above are made more troubling by his much-discussed skepticism regarding the doctrine of Chevron1 deference. Administrative regulations, as well as other interpretations and enforcement guidance from administrative agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) provide invaluable guidance to employers and employees regarding the nature of their rights and responsibilities, and are an essential tool for judges and advocates in resolving employment disputes. One can imagine many ways in which a Supreme Court Justice with Judge Gorsuch’s apparent tendencies regarding employment cases, further unencumbered by any responsibility to defer to authoritative interpretations developed by the agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing our workplace laws, could undermine profoundly the effective enforcement of the employment laws passed by Congress.

The case descriptions that follow constitute representative examples of the ways in which Judge Gorsuch’s jurisprudence in employment cases has manifested itself in cases arising under a number of different employment statutes.

A. Hwang v. Kansas State Univ.2 (Disability Discrimination)

After she was diagnosed with cancer, Professor Grace Hwang requested and received a six-month leave of absence covering the fall semester to recover from a bone marrow transplant. As she was preparing to return to teaching the following January, a flu outbreak erupted on campus. Because her doctor advised her not to subject her compromised immune system to such an environment, she sought further leave, during which she could have worked from home. This request contravened the employer’s rule capping all leave requests to a maximum of six months.

Judge Gorsuch ruled that Professor Hwang’s request for an additional leave of absence was unreasonable and affirmed the dismissal of her case. Applicable law requires that requests for accommodations be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett 3, the Supreme Court suggested that a reasonable accommodation may require an employer to modify an otherwise neutral rule (such as this employer’s six-month cap on leave). Judge Gorsuch’s reasoning also contravened EEOC Enforcement Guidance, and conflicted with rulings from numerous other Circuit Courts of Appeals.

B. Roberts v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.4 (Age Discrimination)

In affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer in this case, Judge Gorsuch demonstrated a number of troubling propensities that employee rights advocates understand all too well: he both drew inferences against the non-moving party and improperly weighed the evidence in a manner that Supreme Court law requires be done by a jury.

In a text message conversation, two of the defendants’ human resources employees were quoted as referencing the plaintiff’s “shelf life” in deciding whether to eliminate his position (they subsequently did). In deciding that the phrase could not constitute direct evidence of discrimination, Judge Gorsuch concluded that “the instant message conversation unmistakably suggests that ‘shelf life’ was nothing worse than an inartful reference to Mr. Roberts’s queue of billable work.”

He then moved to the question of whether the phrase, in conjunction with conflicting evidence regarding the plaintiff’s performance record, could demonstrate that the defendant’s alleged reasons for firing the plaintiff were a pretext for age discrimination. Judge Gorsuch held that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that changes in his performance reviews were a pretext for discrimination unless he could “advance evidence that IBM’s changed evaluation of his performance, whether wise or mistaken, wasn’t honestly arrived at.”

The only way in which Judge Gorsuch could reach such conclusions about the meaning of statements such as “shelf life” and the credibility of the defendant’s asserted reasons for terminating the plaintiff was by drawing a series of inferences in the defendant’s favor, and by avoiding a more common interpretation of the phrase “shelf life” when applied in conversation to an older employee. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent holds that judges must avoid drawing such inferences when deciding whether a case should be dismissed or proceed to trial.5

C. TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board 6 (Whistleblower Retaliation)

Alphonse Maddin worked as a truck driver for the defendant-employer. He was driving a tractor-trailer down an Illinois freeway on a subzero night in 2009 when he noticed that his truck was nearly out of gas. He pulled over because he could not find a fuel station, and ten minutes later, the trailer’s brakes locked up due to the frigid temperatures. Mr. Maddin was unable to resume driving the tractor-trailer and reported the truck’s unsafe condition to a dispatcher. The dispatcher told Mr. Maddin that a repairperson would be sent to fix the brakes.

Mr. Maddin dozed off briefly and awoke to find that his torso was numb and he could not feel his feet. He told the dispatcher about his physical condition and asked when the repairperson would arrive. “[H]ang in there,” the dispatcher responded.

Approximately one half hour later, Mr. Maddin called his supervisor, Larry Cluck, and told Mr. Cluck that his feet were going numb and that he was having difficulty breathing. Mr. Cluck told Mr. Maddin not to leave the trailer and gave him two options: drag the trailer with inoperable brakes, or stay put until the repairperson arrives. Mr. Maddin knew that dragging the trailer was illegal, but concluded that he might not live much longer if he were to wait for a repairperson. Consequently, Mr. Maddin unhitched the trailer and drove off.

Fifteen minutes after Mr. Maddin left—more than three hours after he first notified TransAm that he was stranded in subzero temperatures—the repairperson arrived. Mr. Maddin drove the truck back to meet the repairperson, who then fixed the trailer’s brakes. Less than a week later, TransAm terminated Mr. Maddin for abandoning the trailer. Mr. Maddin filed suit, as the applicable law prohibits an employer from firing an employee who “refuses to operate a vehicle because . . . the employee has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to the employee or the public because of the vehicle’s hazardous safety or security condition.”

An Administrative Law Judge, a panel of the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board (ARB), and a majority of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel that reviewed this case agreed that Mr. Maddin had engaged in protected activity and was retaliated against. Judge Gorsuch, however, dissented, and went out of his way to disregard the ARB’s statutory interpretation, adopt an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the term “operate” to conclude that Mr. Maddin had not engaged in protected activity, and belittle the applicable statute’s health and safety goals as “vague and generic.”

D. Strickland v. UPS, Inc.7 (Retaliation Under the Family and Medical Leave Act and Gender Discrimination)

In this case, the plaintiff was subjected to intense and unwarranted scrutiny of her performance after returning from a protected and approved two-week leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. She was required to attend additional meetings that took her away from her responsibilities, was required to commit to unrealistic performance goals, and was prevented from raising concerns regarding her treatment in line with applicable company policy. Multiple co-workers testified that the plaintiff was treated differently than her all of her co-workers after her return from leave. The treatment worsened to the point where the plaintiff left the company, though she never officially quit and it was unclear whether she intended to return to work.

A majority of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claims (as applied to her retaliation claim), as there was conflicting evidence as to whether the plaintiff intended to return to work. The panel also reversed the district court on the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims, finding that there was evidence that she was treated worse than her male co-workers.

Judge Gorsuch dissented, and would have affirmed the district court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim. Despite the evidence presented that indicated that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than her male co-workers, Judge Gorsuch concluded that the supervisor in question treated both male and female employees poorly. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Gorsuch disregarded evidence from a male co-worker that he was not subjected to the same scrutiny as the plaintiff, despite trailing her in all relevant sales categories. He also relied in part on evidence that another female employee did not also face differential treatment, despite applicable law holding that the fact that the defendant does not discriminate against every employee of the plaintiff’s protected class is no defense to a discrimination claim.

E. Weeks v. Kansas8 (Retaliation)

Judge Gorsuch held that in-house counsel did not engage in protected opposition to alleged unlawful discrimination when she advised a fire marshal to take seriously an employee’s complaints of discrimination, and he affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

This ruling is problematic for its adoption of an exception to existing anti-retaliation laws. This judge-created exception is not included in the text or supported by the purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Pursuant to his approach, employees in positions that require them to monitor an employer’s compliance with the law (such as in-house counsel) must engage in special forms of opposition or participation activity to demonstrate that they have taken a position truly “adverse to their employer.” Absent proof of this higher level of opposition, employees who hold positions such as that of a general counsel, who in many cases will be the employee best equipped to learn about and oppose unlawful workplace discrimination, are not protected against subsequent retaliation.

In affirming summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s case before trial, Judge Gorsuch also refused to resolve the question of whether the exception at issue conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty.,9 which suggested that all one must do to “oppose” unlawful workplace behavior and be protected against retaliation is to “antagonize ...; contend against; ... confront; resist; [or] withstand” it. Judge Gorsuch did so because the plaintiff failed to cite Crawford in her briefs, even though that fact does not prevent a judge from resolving an apparent conflict with binding Supreme Court precedent.

Employees who have been treated unlawfully in the workplace deserve a full and fair opportunity to prove their claims in our federal courts. Reasoning of the type found in many of Judge Gorsuch’s opinions undermines workers’ ability to vindicate their rights and undercuts the promise of a fair and just American workplace that is embodied by the employment statutes enacted by Congress. Judge Gorsuch’s treatment of both the law and facts in the cases cited above, and in others that we reviewed, suggests an ideological perspective which is unsympathetic to workers and too solicitous of employers, and belies his reputation as a committed textualist. As such, we respectfully urge you to oppose Judge Neil M. Gorsuch’s confirmation to the United States Supreme Court.

Sincerely,


Terisa E. Chaw
Executive Director

Read More: ScotusBlog Profile of Gorsuch - Natural Successor to Scalia

$500,000 Defamation Settlement for a Facebook Comment

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According to a report in the ABA Journal, a woman has agreed to pay $500,000 to settle a defamation suit over a comment she made on Facebook that allegedly implied a onetime rival had caused the death of her child. 

The case reportedly resulted from a disagreement between two North Carolina women who originally were cooperating in an effort to take control of a local low-wattage radio station. They had a falling out and eventually the toxic dispute moved online. According to the report, one of the women made a comment on Facebook regarding the other that "I didn't get drunk and kill my kid", implying that the other woman had done so.

The comment was particularly harmful to the other woman because her son was killed by an accidental shooting while playing with another child in the 1970s. 

And while the comment at issue does seem pretty nasty, a $500,000 defamation settlement in a case like this is pretty remarkable. As is often the case with settlements, one wonders if there were other issues motivating the parties that did not make the news reports.

View the entire article.

McDonald's Hit with Sexual Harassment Charges

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The Fight for $15 group, a union-sponsored group, has found another way to pressure McDonald's. The group recently filed EEOC charges on behalf of 15 U.S. McDonald's workers who say they were sexually harassed on the job. 

The Charges were filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against McDonald's USA LLC and individual franchisees in eight states over the last month. The charges include one worker alleging a manager showed her a picture of his genitals and said he wanted to "do things" to her. Another charging party alleged a supervisor offered her $1,000 for oral sex.

A big part of this effort by Fight for $15 has to do with McDonald's claim that it does not employ any of the employees of any of its franchisee restaurants. In a case before the National Labor Relations Board, Fight for $15 claims the company is a joint employer of franchise workers who say they faced retaliation for joining in nationwide strikes organized by the group. McDonald's disclaims responsibility for any employment law violations that occur in its franchise restaurants even though all employment policies and procedures and training emanate from the McDonald's corporation.  

I'll be keeping an eye on these cases as they progress because they have the potential to dramatically change the legal landscape of employment law with regard to franchise business models.  

 

Read More: Reuters

Buc-ee’s Sues Former Employee for Violating Retention Agreement / Non-Compete

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Story in the HoustonPress reports a former employee of the popular Buc-ee's convenience store chain is being sued for more than $60,000.00 for allegedly violating what is called a retention agreement. 

The employee in question, Kelly Rieves, was hired by the store as an assistant manager in Cypress, Texas for total compensation of about $55,000. She was hired as an at-will employee, meaning that the company could fire her for any reason at any time. But Buc-ee’s required her to sign an employment contract that is uncommon in the convenience store industry. It's called a "retention agreement". 

What is a "Retention Agreement"?

The contract Rieves signed divided her pay into two categories, regular pay and “retention pay." The amount allocated to "retention pay" accounted for approximately one-third of her total compensation. The contract allowed the store to recoup the retention pay should she fail to remain employed for a full 48-month term. The contract also required Rieves to give six months' notice before leaving. This is despite the fact that the company maintained the right to terminate Rieves prior to the end of the period. (The contract may or may not have contained notice provisions in favor of the employee that I am not privy to but it would not be required to have such provisions under Texas law.)

Three years later, Rieves decided to leave her job a year or so before her contract expired. We don't know her reasons but we do know she tried to work it out with the company first but her boss refused to let her out from under the contract. So she quit. 

In response, Buc-ee’s sued her for the full amount of the retention pay she earned during her three years with the company -- an amount over $67,000.00.

Are Retention Agreements Legal?

In a word, yes. If drafted properly, retention agreements can be enforced against employees in Texas. However, it is highly unusual to see such an agreement used with anyone other than high-level company executives. 

In the case of Ms. Rieves, a trial court ruled in favor of the company last fall. And it gets worse. The Court also ruled that, in addition to the original sum she owed under the contract, she was also responsible for the company’s legal fees plus interest on the retention pay since she left Buc-ee’s. 

The total the company is now seeking from Rieves approaches $100,000. The matter is currently on appeal. 

The Moral of the Story.

Don't sign an employment contract without having an attorney review it for you. Don't sign an arbitration agreement without having an attorney review it for you. Just don't! 

As a lawyer who primarily represents employees, I spend a fair amount of my time trying to help workers get out of contracts that they never should have signed in the first place. It is an uphill battle. 

The time to negotiate or get changes to employment-related contracts is BEFORE you sign them. Companies do not necessarily have your best interests at heart. You need to understand the implications of what you are signing BEFORE you sign it. A couple hundred dollars spent on lawyer contract review may seem like a lot when you are excited about starting a new job, but compared to the economic havoc that can be caused by signing a contract you don't understand, it's peanuts. 

Get the information you need to protect yourself and your family. It may be the best money you ever spend.

More: Read the entire story from the HoustonPress here.

Beware: Failing to Report Sexual Harassment Can Kill Your Case

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A recent case out of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, McKinnish v. Brennan No. 14-2092 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 2015), serves as a stark reminder of the important of utilizing employer's internal sexual harassment reporting procedures if any are available. 

In McKinnish, the employee received numerous sexually explicit text messages, photos, and videos from her supervisor over a ten-month period. She considered them to be harassing. But she never reported them to her employer as alleged harassment. McKinnish's husband eventually reported the messages to the employer after he discovered them. And the employer did the right thing and immediately terminated the supervisor.

McKinnish later sued and alleged hostile-environment sexual harassment under Title VII. The employer (the U.S. Postal Service) argued that McKinnish's claims should be dismissed because they were subject to what employment lawyers call the Faragher-Ellerth defense. The employer agreed. 

What is the Faragher-Ellerth defense?

In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court used two cases called Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) to create a defense for employers against sexual harassment claims. It later expanded this defense in a case called Vance v. Ball State

The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense applies when: (i) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior; and (ii) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.

In other words, if the employer has an internal policy providing a process for reporting, investigating and correcting incidents of sexual harassment, and employee must make use of that policy. If she fails to do so an it is determined by the court that her refusal to utilize the internal process was unreasonable, she will lose her claim against the company. 

Often, employees don’t want to report sexual harassment internally because it is uncomfortable to talk with someone in HR about the problem, because the employee doesn’t believe HR really has her best interests at heart, or she fears retaliation.  In fact, that is exactly what Ms. McKinnish argued in her case. Sadly, the court rejected this argument, holding that an employee’s “subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation” do not alleviate the employee’s duty to alert his or her employer to an allegedly hostile environment.

Bottom Line: Report Sexual Harassment

This is an area where the Supreme Court has been pretty consistent. The courts want employers and employees to try to work out employment-related problems before they resort to going to court. The law requires you to give the company a chance to do the right thing before you sue them. 

  • If you are being sexually harassed, report it.

  • Report it in writing (email is fine).

  • Keep a copy (print the email).

Is it possible that in response to your report the company won’t take any action or might even retaliate against you? Yep. But if that happens then a lawyer will be in a much better position to help you and the court will be much more likely rule in your favor.

Another Court Follows Wallace Decision - FRCP 9(b) Fraud Pleading Standard Does Not Apply to SOX Whistleblower Cases

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As previously written about here, I had the privilege this year of being a part of the team of lawyers representing the plaintiff in Wallace v. Tesoro. The opinion issued in favor of my client by the Fifth Circuit in that case created very positive law for SOX whistleblowers around the country. 

This past week I learned of a recent decision from the District of Connecticut in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower retaliation case that adopted the Wallace pleading standard for SOX whistleblowers. The case serves to underscore the broad scope of protected conduct under SOX. In Wiggins v. ING, the court held that the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard for fraud claims does not apply to SOX retaliation claims and a whistleblower can plead that she had a reasonable belief that her employer violated one of section 1514A’s enumerated fraud provisions without specifically alleging that she believed that the employer’s conduct satisfied all of the elements of the federal statute/SEC rule that was allegedly violated.

In Wiggins, the Plaintiff worked as an operations consultant at an insurance company. She alleged that she disclosed irregularities in the processing of terminated retirement plans that reflected a lack of compliance with federal securities laws, including “frequent inaccuracies in market value assessments on retirement plans that were being terminated and sent to other providers, incorrect and inconsistent application of deferred sales charges, and deliberately failing to provide identified “problem” files for quarterly auditing procedures.” She alleged that the company terminated her employment in response to her whistleblowing.

Court Holds: Rule 9(b) Does Not Apply to SOX Whistleblower Claims

The company argued that Ms. Wiggins’ complaint should be dismissed because it alleged she had blown the whistle about fraudulent activities but did not allege said fraud with the heightened particularity required under Rule 9(b) for pleadings in which a defendant is sued for fraud.

The court rejected the company's argument and concluded that the “reasonable belief” standard set forth in the statutory text obviates any requirement for a SOX whistleblower to prove actual fraud:

ING’s argument overlooks the fact that section 1514A(a)(1) “protects an employee who `reasonably believes’ that conduct violates an enumerated statute.” Wallace v. Tesoro Corp., 796 F.3d 468, 480 (5th Cir. 2015). As such, there is room for a plaintiff to maintain a SOX whistleblower claim under Section 1514A, assuming he has satisfied the other pleading requirements, “even if the [complained of] conduct turns out not to be fraudulent.” Id.; see also Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 2008) (“a whistleblower need not show that the corporate defendant committed fraud to prevail in her retaliation claim under § 1514A”). Because section 1514A protects the employee who acted under a reasonable belief that fraud was occurring — rather than protecting only those employees who report activity that is, in fact, fraudulent —”Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) does not apply because [Wiggins] brings a retaliation claim based on his reasonable belief of fraud rather than a claim necessitating proof of fraud.” Jin Huang v. Harman Intern. Industries Inc., Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-1263-VLB, 2015 WL 4601047, at *2 n. 3 (D. Conn. July 29, 2015); see also Wallace, 796 F.3d at 480 (“Although [the defendant] maintains that dismissal can be affirmed for failing to satisfy Rule 9(b), it is plain from the rule’s text that it does not apply to this [SOX] retaliation suit”). Thus, ING’s argument that the Amended Complaint must be dismissed because it does not meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) is without merit, because SOX whistleblower claims do not need to be plead in accordance with this heightened standard.

The court went on to state that “a SOX whistleblower plaintiff can state that she had a reasonable belief that her employer violated one of section 1514A’s enumerated provisions, without specifically alleging that she believed that the employer’s conduct satisfied all of the elements of the federal statute/SEC rule that was allegedly violated.” In addition, the court noted that “in order for a SOX whistleblower plaintiff to allege that she reasonably believed that her employer was violating one of the enumerated provisions, the plaintiff must allege that she believed, at least approximately, that her employer’s actions satisfied the elements of the enumerated provision allegedly violated.”

Wiggins follows the Fifth Circuit's holding in Wallace, of broadly construing SOX protected whistleblowers and refusing to impose a heightened standard of objective reasonableness. This is important because it makes it much more difficult for an employer to seek dismissal of a SOX whistleblower case at the pleading stage on a motion to dismiss.

 

Hat Tip: Jason Zuckerman

Fifth Circuit Reinstates SOX Whistleblower Claim Against Tesoro Corp.

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A unanimous panel of the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals issued a decision last Friday reinstating Plaintiff Kevin Wallace’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) whistleblower claim against Tesoro Corp. 

Wallace worked for the petroleum company Tesoro as Vice President of Pricing and Commercial Analysis. He discovered structural flaws in Tesoro’s accounting system that garbled important financial results and tax reporting used by management, the Board of Directors, and Tesoro’s public filings. Wallace confirmed his findings with company experts and reported them internally. On March 12, 2010, Wallace reported internally that he was being retaliated against by management. He was fired within hours of this report.

The district court had previously dismissed the case based on several procedural motions filed by Tesoro. Tesoro argued that the case needed to be plead pursuant to FRCP 9(b)'s strict fraud pleading requirements. Tesoro also argued that the lawsuit raised factual issues that had not been presented with particularity to OSHA (the administrative agency charged with conducting initial investigation into SOX charges).

The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the case back to district court for further proceedings and discovery. In rejecting Tesoro's arguments, the Court stated:

The requirements of Rule 9(b) show how poorly it would work as a benchmark for reasonable belief that fraud is occurring. “At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires allegations of the particulars of time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 724 (5th Cir. 2003). But an employee who is providing information about potential fraud or assisting in a nascent fraud investigation might not know who is making the false representations or what that person is obtaining by the fraud; indeed, that may be the point of the investigation. Leaving those employees unprotected would have grave consequences for the statutory scheme of employee protection embodied in § 1514A and would do so in a way that appears completely unrelated to whether a belief actually is reasonable.

SOX was enacted as a reaction to a number of major corporate and accounting scandals, including Enron, and Worldcom. The law protects employees from retaliation for engaging in protected activity, which is defined as:

"any lawful act done by the employee to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341 [mail fraud], 1343 [wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders . . ."


The undersigned is counsel for Mr. Wallace, co-counseling with San Antonio attorney Alex Katzman and Washington D.C. attorney Richard Renner. The U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor of Labor, participated with an amicus brief asking the Fifth Circuit to reverse.


Download: Wallace v. Tesoro Corp., No. 13-51010 (5th Cir. 7-31-2015).

EEOC Begins a Rollout of New Online Charge-Handling System

ACT Digital Pilot Program Allows Online Interaction With Employers


Last week the EEOC announced that 11 of its 53 offices will begin a pilot program called ACT Digital to digitally transmit documents between the EEOC and employers regarding discrimination charges. This is the first step in the EEOC's move toward an online charge system that will streamline the submission of documents, notices and communications in the EEOC's charge system. This system applies to private and public employers, unions and employment agencies.

The EEOC receives about 90,000 charges per year, making its charge system the agency's most common interaction with the public. The EEOC's ACT Digital initiative aims to improve customer service, ease the administrative burden on staff, and reduce the use of paper submissions and files.

The first phase of ACT Digital allows employers against whom a charge has been filed to communicate with the EEOC through a secure portal to download the charge, review and respond to an invitation to mediate, submit a position statement, and provide and verify their contact information. The newly designed EEOC notice of a charge will provide a password-protected log in for the employer to access the system in the pilot offices. Employers will also have the option of opting out of the pilot program and receiving and submitting all documents and communications in paper form.

EEOC Chair Jenny R. Yang commended ACT Digital as an innovative first step in streamlining the agency's charge system.

"The EEOC's pilot of a digital charge system is an important step forward that will benefit the public and our staff," Chair Yang noted. "This will improve our responsiveness to the public, efficiently utilize our resources, and protect the security of documents in our online system. We encourage employers to provide candid feedback and suggestions during the pilots so we can make adjustments to strengthen the system."

The pilot begins May 6, 2015 in the following EEOC offices: Charlotte, Greensboro, Greenville, Norfolk, Raleigh, Richmond and San Francisco. The EEOC offices in Denver, Detroit, Indianapolis and Phoenix will also begin their pilots by the end of May 2015.

Follow-Up Links


Same-Sex Spouses Enjoy FMLA Protection In All But Four States - And Yep, Texas is One of the Four

There has been a good deal of reporting over the last month or so about the Department of Labor's recently-implemented final FMLA rule that expanded the definition of “spouse” under the FMLA to include employees in legal same-sex marriages. Both employee-side and employer-side groups praised the new rule because it brought uniformity to FMLA regulations.

Although this rule took effect on March 27, 2015, a federal district court ruling in Texas left the status of the new rule in limbo.

After the DOL issued its final rule, Attorneys General in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska filed suit in a federal district court in Texas asking the court to strike down the DOL’s final rule. The court granted an injunction and halted the DOL’s enforcement of its final rule. Given this ruling, it was uncertain what the DOL would do. The agency has since announced that it will not enforce the rule in the four states of Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana and Nebraska.

In a court filing, the DOL said: “[W]hile the preliminary injunction remains in effect, the [DOL does] not intend to take any action to enforce the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) . . . against the states of Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, or Nebraska, or officers, agencies, or employees of those states acting in their official capacity, in a manner that employs the definition of the term “spouse” contained in the February 25, 2015, final rule . . . .”

However, the DOL confirmed it will enforce the rule in the remaining 46 states. 

EEOC Updates Its Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination – Questions and Answers

The EEOC recently issued Enforcement Guidance on pregnancy discrimination for the first time in over thirty years. The guidance suggests that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s (“PDA”) coverage may be much broader and provide workers much more protection than many employers previously thought. The Enforcement Guidance updates prior guidance on this subject in light of legal developments over the past thirty years.

The guidance (full copy of which can be found here) includes discussions of:

  • when employer actions may constitute unlawful discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA);

  • the obligation of employers under the PDA to provide pregnant workers equal access to benefits of employment such as leave, light duty, and health benefits; and

  • how Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which went into effect over a decade after the PDA and was amended in 2008 to broaden the definition of disability, applies to individuals with pregnancy-related impairments.

The PDA clarifies that discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions is a prohibited form of sex discrimination. It requires that employers treat women affected by pregnancy or related medical conditions the same way they treat non-pregnant applicants or employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work.

Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability and requires covered employers to provide reasonable accommodations to the known limitations of otherwise qualified employees and applicants for employment. Although pregnancy itself is not a disability, impairments related to pregnancy can be disabilities if they substantially limit one or more major life activities or substantially limited major life activities in the past. The ADA also covers pregnant workers who are regarded as having disabilities.

Both the PDA and the ADA apply to private and state and local government employers with 15 or more employees, labor organizations, employment agencies, and apprenticeship and training programs. The PDA applies to employees in the federal sector, as does Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which applies the ADA’s employment nondiscrimination standards. Beyond these federal laws, state and local laws in some jurisdictions provide additional protections.

With this new guidance in mind, here are some EEOC answers to some commonly asked questions regarding pregnancy discrimination and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”):

General Prohibitions and Requirements

  • What workplace actions are prohibited under the PDA?

Under the PDA, an employer cannot fire, refuse to hire, demote, or take any other adverse action against a woman if pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. The PDA prohibits discrimination with respect to all aspects of employment, including pay, job assignments, promotions, layoffs, training, and fringe benefits (such as leave and health insurance).

  • Does the PDA protect individuals who are not currently pregnant based on their ability or intention to become pregnant?

Yes. The PDA’s protection extends to differential treatment based on an employee’s fertility or childbearing capacity. Thus sex-specific policies restricting women from certain jobs based on childbearing capacity, such as those banning fertile women from jobs with exposure to harmful chemicals, are generally prohibited. An employer’s concern about risks to a pregnant employee or her fetus will rarely, if ever, justify such restrictions. Sex-specific job restrictions can only be justified if the employer can show that lack of childbearing capacity is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), that is, reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business. (See also Question 7, below.)

An employer is also prohibited from discriminating against an employee because she has stated that she intends to become pregnant. Thus, demoting an employee with a good performance record two weeks after she informed her manager that she was trying to become pregnant would constitute evidence of pregnancy discrimination.

  • May an employer ask an employee or applicant whether she is pregnant or if she intends to become pregnant soon?

Although Title VII does not prohibit employers from asking applicants or employees about gender-related characteristics such as pregnancy, such questions are generally discouraged. The EEOC will consider the fact that an employer has asked such a question when evaluating a charge alleging pregnancy discrimination. Adverse decisions relating to hiring, assignments, or promotion, that are based on an employer’s assumptions or stereotypes about pregnant workers’ attendance, schedules, physical ability to work, or commitment to their jobs, are unlawful.

  • Is an employee or applicant protected from discrimination because of her past pregnancy?

Yes. An employee or applicant may not be subjected to discrimination because of a past pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition. For example, an employer would violate the PDA by terminating an employee shortly after she returns from medically-related pregnancy leave following the birth of her child if the employee’s pregnancy is the reason for the termination. Close proximity between the employee’s return to work and the employer’s decision to terminate her, coupled with an explanation for the termination that is not believable (e.g., unsubstantiated performance problems by an employee who has always been a good performer), would constitute evidence of pregnancy discrimination.

  • What are examples of medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth?

Medical conditions related to pregnancy may include symptoms such as back pain; disorders such as preeclampsia (pregnancy-induced high blood pressure) and gestational diabetes; complications requiring bed rest; and the after-effects of a delivery. (For information about the application of the ADA to pregnancy-related medical conditions, see Question 18, below.)

Lactation is also a pregnancy-related medical condition. An employee who is lactating must be able to address lactation-related needs to the same extent as she and her coworkers are able to address other similarly limiting medical conditions. For example, if an employer allows employees to change their schedules or use sick leave for routine doctor appointments and to address non-incapacitating medical conditions, then it must allow female employees to change their schedules or use sick leave for lactation-related needs.

In addition to being protected under the PDA, female hourly employees who are breastfeeding have rights under other laws, including a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to require employers to provide reasonable break time and a private place for breastfeeding employees to express milk. The Department of Labor has published a Fact Sheet providing general information on the break time requirement for nursing mothers. The Fact Sheet can be found at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs73.htm.

Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities

  • Does the law provide protections for caregivers?

Discrimination based on an employee’s caregiving responsibilities may violate Title VII if it is based on sex. For instance, an employer would violate Title VII by denying job opportunities to women, but not to men, with young children, or by reassigning a woman who has recently returned from maternity leave to less desirable work based on the assumption that, as a new mother, she will be less committed to her job. Although leave related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions can be limited to women affected by those conditions, if an employer provides parental leave, it must be provided to similarly situated men and women on the same terms. In addition, employers covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) must provide eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of job-protected leave to care for and bond with a newborn baby or a recently adopted child. Discrimination based on an employee’s caregiving responsibilities may violate the ADA if it is based on the employee’s relationship with an individual with a disability. See Question 22, below.

Concerns About Safety and Ability to Perform the Job

  • Will an employer violate the PDA if it takes an adverse action against a pregnant worker based on concerns about her health and safety?

Yes. Although an employer may, of course, require that a pregnant worker be able to perform the duties of her job, adverse employment actions, including those related to hiring, assignments, or promotion, that are based on an employer’s assumptions or stereotypes about pregnant workers’ attendance, schedules, physical ability to work, or commitment to their jobs, are unlawful. Even when an employer believes it is acting in an employee’s best interest, adverse actions based on assumptions or stereotypes are prohibited. For instance, it is unlawful for an employer to involuntarily reassign a pregnant employee to a lower paying job involving fewer deadlines based on an assumption that the stress and fast-paced work required in her current job would increase risks associated with her pregnancy.

An employer may only reassign a pregnant worker based on concerns about her health or the health of her fetus if it can establish that non-pregnancy or non-fertility is a BFOQ as described in Question 2, above. In very few, if any, situations will an employer be able to establish this defense.

  • May an employer take an adverse action against a pregnant worker because of the views or opinions of co-workers or customers?

No. Just as an employer cannot refuse to hire or retain a pregnant woman because of its own prejudices against pregnant women, it cannot take an adverse action against a pregnant worker because of the prejudices of co-workers, clients, or customers. For instance, an employer may not place a pregnant worker who can perform her job on leave based on her co-workers’ belief that she will place additional burdens on them and interfere with their productivity.

Harassment

  • Does the PDA protect employees from harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions?

Yes. Unwelcome and offensive jokes or name-calling, physical assaults or threats, intimidation, ridicule, insults, offensive objects or pictures, and interference with work performance that is motivated by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions may constitute unlawful harassment. Whether the conduct is sufficiently hostile to constitute unlawful harassment depends on factors such as the frequency of the conduct or its severity. Employer liability can result from the conduct of supervisors, coworkers, or non-employees such as customers or business partners over whom the employer has some control.

Equal Access to Benefits
An employer is required under the PDA to treat an employee temporarily unable to perform the functions of her job because of her pregnancy or a related medical condition in the same manner as it treats other employees similar in their ability or inability to work, whether by providing modified tasks, alternative assignments, or fringe benefits such as disability leave.

Light Duty

  • If a pregnant employee needs light duty (temporary work that is less physically demanding than her normal duties), is the employer required under the PDA to provide it?

Yes, if it provides light duty for employees who are not pregnant but who are similar in their ability or inability to work. An employer may not treat pregnant workers differently from employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work based on the cause of their limitations. For example, an employer may not deny light duty to a pregnant employee based on a policy that limits light duty to employees with on-the-job injuries.

  • Does EEOC’s interpretation of the PDA create preferential treatment for pregnant workers?

No. Consistent with the language of the law, the EEOC’s position is that the PDA requires only that an employer treat pregnant workers the same as it treats workers who are not pregnant but who are similar in their ability or inability to work. Thus, an employer may offer light duty to pregnant employees on the same terms that it offers light duty to other workers similar in their ability or inability to work. For example, if an employer’s policy places certain types of restrictions on the availability of light duty positions, such as limits on the number of light duty positions or the duration of light duty, the employer may lawfully apply the same restrictions to pregnant workers as it applies to non-pregnant workers. If an employer does not provide light duty to employees who are not pregnant, it does not have to do so for pregnant workers.

Leave

  • May an employer require a pregnant employee who is able to perform her job to take leave at any point in her pregnancy or after childbirth?

No. An employer may not force an employee to take leave because she is or has been pregnant, as long as she is able to perform her job. Requiring leave violates the PDA even if the employer believes it is acting in the employee’s best interest. If an employee has been absent from work as a result of a pregnancy-related condition and then recovers, her employer may not require her to remain on leave until the baby’s birth; nor may an employer prohibit an employee from returning to work for a certain length of time after childbirth.

  • May an employer impose greater restrictions on pregnancy-related medical leave than on other medical leave?

No. Under the PDA, an employer must allow women with physical limitations resulting from pregnancy to take leave on the same terms and conditions as others who are similar in their ability or inability to work. Thus, an employer:

may not fire a pregnant employee for being absent if her absence is covered by the employer’s sick leave policy;
may not require employees limited by pregnancy or related medical conditions to first exhaust their sick leave before using other types of accrued leave if it does not impose the same requirements on employees who seek leave for other medical conditions;
may not impose a shorter maximum period for pregnancy-related leave than for other types of medical or short-term disability leave; and
must allow an employee who is temporarily disabled due to pregnancy to take leave without pay to the same extent that other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work are allowed to do so.
An employer must also hold open a job for a pregnancy-related absence for the same length of time that jobs are held open for employees on sick or temporary disability leave. If the pregnant employee used leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the employer must restore the employee to her original job or to an equivalent job with equivalent pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment.

Note that under the ADA, an employer may have to provide leave in addition to that provided under its normal leave policy as a reasonable accommodation for someone with a pregnancy-related impairment that is a disability. (For more information about the obligation to make reasonable accommodations under the ADA, see Questions 23–25, below.)

  • Must an employer provide leave to bond with, or care for, a newborn (called “parental leave” in the Guidance)?

Under the PDA, leave related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions may be limited to women affected by those conditions, but parental leave must be provided to similarly situated men and women on the same terms. If, for example, an employer extends leave to new mothers beyond the period of recuperation from childbirth, it cannot lawfully refuse to provide an equivalent amount of leave to new fathers for the same purpose. In addition, the FMLA requires covered employers to provide 12 weeks of job-protected leave for covered employees to care for and bond with a newborn baby or a recently adopted child.

Health Insurance

  • Are employers who provide health insurance benefits required to provide insurance that includes coverage of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions?

Yes. Employers who have health insurance benefit plans must apply the same terms and conditions for pregnancy-related costs as for medical costs unrelated to pregnancy. If the plan covers pre-existing conditions – as all health plans are required to do as of January 1, 2014, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – then it must cover the costs of an insured employee’s pre-existing pregnancy. If the plan covers a particular percentage of the medical costs incurred for nonpregnancy-related conditions, it must cover the same percentage of recoverable costs for pregnancy-related expenses.

Employers can violate the PDA by providing health insurance that excludes coverage of prescription contraceptives, whether the contraceptives are prescribed for birth control or for medical purposes. To comply with Title VII, an employer’s health insurance plan must cover prescription contraceptives on the same basis as prescription drugs, devices, and services that are used to prevent the occurrence of medical conditions other than pregnancy. For example, if an employer’s health insurance plan covers preventive care for medical conditions other than pregnancy, such as vaccinations, physical examinations, or prescription drugs to prevent high blood pressure or to lower cholesterol levels, then prescription contraceptives also must be covered.

  • May employers covered by the PDA refuse to provide coverage of prescription contraceptives if they have religious objections to doing so?

In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court recently ruled that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to closely held for-profit corporations whose owners had religious objections to providing certain types of contraceptives. EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance explains Title VII’s prohibition of pregnancy discrimination; it does not address whether certain employers might be exempt from Title VII’s requirements under the RFRA or under the Constitution’s First Amendment.

Proof of Pregnancy Discrimination

  • How can a pregnant worker prove that an adverse action was the result of pregnancy discrimination under the PDA?

A PDA violation will be found if an employee’s pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action. Evidence of discriminatory motive may include an explicit policy that treats pregnant workers less favorably; statements of decision-makers demonstrating pregnancy bias; close timing between an adverse action and a decision-maker’s knowledge of the employee’s pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition; and more favorable treatment of employees of either sex who are not affected by pregnancy but who are similar in their ability or inability to work.
Discrimination may also occur when a neutral policy or practice has a disparate (or disproportionate) impact on pregnant employees if an employer cannot show that the policy or practice is job related and consistent with business necessity. Examples may include policies that exclude all or substantially all pregnant employees from access to light duty or leave.

 

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Covered Disabilities

  • Are pregnant employees covered under Title I of the ADA?

In some circumstances, employees with pregnancy-related impairments may be covered by the ADA. Although pregnancy itself is not an impairment within the meaning of the ADA and thus is not a disability, pregnant workers and job applicants are not excluded from the ADA’s protections. Changes to the definition of the term “disability” resulting from the enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 make it much easier for individuals with pregnancy-related impairments to demonstrate that they have disabilities and are thus entitled to the ADA’s protection.

Pregnancy-related impairments are disabilities if they substantially limit one or more major life activities or substantially limited major life activities in the past. Major life activities that may be affected by pregnancy-related impairments include walking, standing, and lifting, as well as major bodily functions such as the musculoskeletal, neurological, cardiovascular, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. The term disability should be construed broadly, and the determination of whether someone has a disability should not demand extensive analysis. An impairment does not have to prevent, or severely or significantly restrict, performance of a major life activity to be considered substantially limiting, and impairments of short duration that are sufficiently limiting can be disabilities.

The ADA also covers pregnant workers who are regarded as having disabilities. An employer regards a pregnant worker as having a disability if it takes an adverse action against her (e.g., refuses to hire or terminates her) because of an actual or perceived pregnancy-related impairment, unless the employer can demonstrate that the impairment is transitory (lasting or expected to last for six months or less) and minor.

  • What are examples of pregnancy-related impairments that may be substantially limiting within the meaning of the ADA?

Examples of pregnancy-related impairments that may substantially limit major life activities include pelvic inflammation, which may substantially limit the ability to walk, or pregnancy-related carpal tunnel syndrome affecting the ability to lift or to perform manual tasks. Impairments that may substantially limit reproductive functions include disorders of the uterus or cervix that may necessitate certain physical restrictions to enable a full term pregnancy, or may result in limitations following childbirth. Pregnancy-related impairments that may substantially limit other major bodily functions include pregnancy-related sciatica limiting musculoskeletal functions; gestational diabetes limiting endocrine function; and preeclampsia, which causes high blood pressure, affecting cardiovascular and circulatory functions.

  • When does an employer discriminate against a pregnant applicant or employee based on a record of a disability?

An employer discriminates against an applicant or employee on the basis of her record of a disability when it takes an adverse action against her because of a past substantially limiting impairment. For instance, an employer would violate the ADA by denying employment to a job applicant based on a history of gestational diabetes that resolved itself following the birth of her child three years earlier.

  • When does an employer regard someone who is pregnant as having a disability?

An employer regards a pregnant applicant or employee as having a disability if it takes a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived pregnancy-related impairment that is not both transitory (lasting or expected to last six months or less) and minor. For instance, if an employer makes an adverse employment decision such as involuntarily reassigning a pregnant employee to a lower paying, less physically demanding position because it believes that the employee is experiencing pregnancy-related “complications,” it regards the employee as having a disability. The employer would be liable for discrimination if the employee is able to do the essential functions of her job without posing a “direct threat” (i.e., a significant risk of substantial harm) to herself or others.

  • Does the ADA protect the parents of a newborn with a disability?

Yes. The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals who have a known “association” with an individual with a disability. Thus, for example, an employer would violate the ADA by refusing to hire the mother or father of a newborn with a disability because it was concerned that the applicant would take a lot of time off to care for the child or that the child’s medical condition would impose high health care costs.

Pregnancy and Reasonable Accommodation

  • What is a reasonable accommodation?

A reasonable accommodation is a change in the workplace or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to apply for a job, perform a job’s essential functions, or enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment.

  • Must an employer provide a reasonable accommodation to a worker with a pregnancy- related impairment who requests one?

Yes, if the accommodation is necessary because of a pregnancy-related impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. An employer may only deny a needed reasonable accommodation to an employee with a disability who has asked for one if it would result in an undue hardship. An undue hardship is defined as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.

  • What are some accommodations a pregnant worker may need?

Examples of reasonable accommodations that may be necessary for someone whose pregnancy-related impairment is a disability include:

  • Redistributing marginal or nonessential functions (for example, occasional lifting) that a pregnant worker cannot perform, or altering how an essential or marginal function is performed;

  • Modifying workplace policies, such as allowing a pregnant worker more frequent breaks or allowing her to keep a water bottle at a workstation even though keeping drinks at workstations is generally prohibited;

  • Modifying a work schedule so that someone who experiences severe morning sickness can arrive later than her usual start time and leave later to make up the time;

  • Allowing a pregnant worker placed on bed rest to telework where feasible;

  • Granting leave in addition to what an employer would normally provide under a sick leave policy;

  • Purchasing or modifying equipment, such as a stool for a pregnant employee who needs to sit while performing job tasks typically performed while standing; and

  • Temporarily reassigning an employee to a light duty position.

THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

  • Does the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provide additional protections for pregnant workers and parents?

Yes. Although Title VII does not require an employer to provide pregnancy-related or child care leave if it provides no leave for other temporary illness or family obligations, employers covered by the FMLA (those with 50 or more employees) must provide eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of leave in a 12-month period for the birth of a child and to care for a newborn child, for the placement with the employee of a child for adoption or foster care or to care for the newly placed child, for the employee’s own serious health condition, or for the employee to care for a spouse or child who has a serious health condition. Employees with such a need for family or medical leave are eligible if they worked for a covered employer for a year and for at least 1,250 hours during the immediately preceding year. The FMLA is enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor. For more information about the FMLA see http://www.dol.gov/whd.

A Win for Pregnant Workers at the Supreme Court

Peggy Young, a UPS driver who was forced from her when she got pregnant because the company wouldn’t allow her to work light duty, was victorious late last month at the U.S. Supreme Court. You can read the entire opinion here.

"Conservative" Supreme Court Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito joined with the "liberal" justices on the Court in what most observers are characterizing as a big win, not just for pregnant women, but also for all women in the workplace. That is no small feat from a court that has in recent years narrowed interpretations of anti-discrimination law and been reluctant to impose any new burdens on businesses. 

The case had brought together an unusual alliance of women’s rights activists and anti-abortion groups, who argued that women shouldn’t have to choose between her pregnancy and her job.

The 6-3 opinion, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, sends the Young case back to the Fourth Circuit of Appeals, which had previously ruled against Young, with a new set of rules that should make Young’s chances of prevailing “very strong.” The Fourth Circuit, Breyer wrote, should have asked, “Why, when the employer accommodated so many, could it not accommodate pregnant women as well?”

Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented. Young argued that because UPS accommodated other kinds of workers, such as injured ones or drivers who had lost their Department of Transportation licenses, it was discriminatory not to extend the same to pregnant women who also temporarily needed to be accommodated. The court’s majority didn’t entirely accept that argument, but it did say that pregnant workers could bring claims under the long-settled "McDonnell Douglass process for adjudicating other discriminatory claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Under the court’s reasoning, Young wouldn’t have to show UPS was intentionally discriminating against pregnant workers, but a court would have to “consider the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats non-pregnant workers similar in their ability or inability to work.”

UPS has reportedly already changed its policy to explicitly include accommodations for pregnant workers, but the rules laid out by the case will impact working women at companies around the country, since they guide lower courts in future litigation.  

EEOC Releases 2014 Statistics

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) today released a comprehensive set of fiscal year 2014 private sector data tables providing detailed breakdowns for the 88,778 charges of workplace discrimination the agency received. The fiscal year ran from Oct. 1, 2013, to Sept. 30, 2014.

The number of charges filed decreased compared with recent fiscal years, due in part to the government shutdown during the reporting period. While charge filings were down overall compared to the previous fiscal year, first quarter charge filings--which included the period of the shutdown--were 3,000 to 5,000 less than the other quarters.

Among the charges the EEOC received, the percentage of charges alleging retaliation reached its highest amount ever: 42.8 percent. The percentage of charges alleging race discrimination, the second most common allegation, has remained steady at approximately 35 percent. In fiscal year 2014, the EEOC obtained $296.1 million in total monetary relief through its enforcement program prior to the filing of litigation.

The number of lawsuits on the merits filed by the EEOC's Office of General Counsel throughout the nation was 133, up slightly from the previous two fiscal years. A lawsuit on the merits involves an allegation of discrimination, compared with procedural lawsuits, which are filed mostly to enforce subpoenas or for preliminary relief. Monetary relief from cases litigated, including settlements, totaled $22.5 million.

"Behind these numbers are individuals who turned to the EEOC because they believe that they have suffered unlawful discrimination," said EEOC Chair Jenny R. Yang. "The EEOC remains committed to meaningful resolution of charges and strategic enforcement to eliminate barriers to equal employment opportunity."

The updated data include the popular tables of Statutes by Issue and Bases by Issue. "Bases" refers to the protected characteristics giving rise to the discrimination, such as sex or age. In contrast "issue" is the discriminatory action, such as discharge or failure to promote.

More specifically, the charge numbers show the following breakdowns by bases alleged in descending order.

  • Retaliation under all statutes: 37,955 (42.8 percent of all charges filed)

  • Race (including racial harassment): 31,073 (35 percent)

  • Sex (including pregnancy and sexual harassment): 26,027 (29.3 percent)

  • Disability: 25,369 (28.6 percent)

  • Age: 20,588 (23.2 percent)

  • National Origin: 9,579 (10.8 percent)

  • Religion: 3,549 (4.0 percent)

  • Color: 2,756 (3.1 percent)

  • Equal Pay Act: 938 (1.1 percent) but note that sex-based wage discrimination can also be charged under Title VII's sex discrimination provision

  • Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act: 333 (0.4 percent)

These percentages add up to more than 100 because some charges allege multiple bases, such as discrimination on the bases of race and color, or sex and retaliation.

In fiscal year 2014, 30 percent of the charges filed with EEOC alleged the issue of harassment on various bases, such as race harassment or harassment on the basis of disability. Preventing harassment through systemic enforcement and targeted outreach is a priority issue for the Commission. The January 14, 2015 Commission meeting focused on Workplace Harassment. The new table for All Harassment Charges includes sexual harassment as well as other forms of harassment. Sexual Harassment still remains as a separate table, joined by new tables showing charges of Race Harassment as well as Charges Alleging Harassment Other than Sexual Harassment.

Discharge continues to be the most common issue for all bases under Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA. Allegations of harassment for all bases were the next most frequently cited issue, with the exception of race. For the basis of race, discriminatory terms and conditions of employment was the second most frequently cited issue (9,332), with harassment being the third (9,023).

The updated tables also include Charges by State. The greatest number of charges were filed in Texas (8,035), followed by Florida (7,528) and California (6,363).