What is Labor Day?

As we enjoy another Labor Day weekend, here are some quick facts about the holiday designed to celebrate workers.

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How Labor Day Came About

"Labor Day differs in every essential from the other holidays of the year in any country," said Samuel Gompers, founder and longtime president of the American Federation of Labor. "All other holidays are in a more or less degree connected with conflicts and battles of man's prowess over man, of strife and discord for greed and power, of glories achieved by one nation over another. Labor Day...is devoted to no man, living or dead, to no sect, race, or nation."

Labor Day, the first Monday in September, is a creation of the labor movement and is dedicated to the social and economic achievements of American workers. It constitutes a yearly national tribute to the contributions workers have made to the strength, prosperity and well-being of our country.

Founder of Labor Day

More than 100 years after the first Labor Day observance, there is still some doubt as to who first proposed the holiday for workers.

Some records show that Peter J. McGuire, general secretary of the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and a co-founder of the American Federation of Labor, was first in suggesting a day to honor those "who from rude nature have delved and carved all the grandeur we behold."

But Peter McGuire's place in Labor Day history has not gone unchallenged. Many believe that Matthew Maguire, a machinist, not Peter McGuire, founded the holiday. Recent research seems to support the contention that Matthew Maguire, later the secretary of Local 344 of the International Association of Machinists in Paterson, N.J., proposed the holiday in 1882 while serving as secretary of the Central Labor Union in New York. What is clear is that the Central Labor Union adopted a Labor Day proposal and appointed a committee to plan a demonstration and picnic.

The First Labor Day

The first Labor Day holiday was celebrated on Tuesday, September 5, 1882, in New York City, in accordance with the plans of the Central Labor Union. The Central Labor Union held its second Labor Day holiday just a year later, on September 5, l883.

In l884 the first Monday in September was selected as the holiday, as originally proposed, and the Central Labor Union urged similar organizations in other cities to follow the example of New York and celebrate a "workingmen's holiday" on that date. The idea spread with the growth of labor organizations, and in l885 Labor Day was celebrated in many industrial centers of the country.

Labor Day Legislation

Through the years the nation gave increasing emphasis to Labor Day. The first governmental recognition came through municipal ordinances passed during 1885 and 1886. From them developed the movement to secure state legislation. The first state bill was introduced into the New York legislature, but the first to become law was passed by Oregon on February 2l, l887. During the year four more states -- Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York -- created the Labor Day holiday by legislative enactment. By the end of the decade Connecticut, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania had followed suit. By 1894, 23 other states had adopted the holiday in honor of workers, and on June 28 of that year, Congress passed an act making the first Monday in September of each year a legal holiday in the District of Columbia and the territories.

Have a great Labor Day weekend everybody!

New Labor Rule Means Gig Economy Workers In Texas Can't Get Unemployment Benefits


Last month, the state’s labor regulator approved a controversial new rule on gig economy workers – a rule opponents say will have negative implications for these workers going forward.

Approved on a 2-1 vote, the rule from the Texas Workforce Commission exempts app-based companies that hire contractors – like TaskRabbit or DoorDash – from paying state unemployment insurance taxes for those workers. The three-member commission gave initial approval for the rule in December.

Labor unions and workers advocates say the new rules were tailor-made by lobbyists from a firm called Handy. The agency has defended its rule-making process, saying it is well within its legislatively appointed rights to rule on employment matters and that, per state law, it allowed 30 days of public comment before initially adopting the rules. Opponents have said the rules could incentivize companies to abandon brick-and-mortar businesses to avoid paying those state unemployment taxes.

The risk is that the rule would likely reclassify many construction workers as independent contractors, leaving them without those protections for wage theft and discrimination on job-sites.

Read more: KUT Article

One Senator Blocks Trump-Nominated Reappointment of EEOC’s only LGBTQ Commissioner

Chai Feldblum, a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Chai Feldblum, a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

GOP senator Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah has used his power in the Senate to block the reappointment of the EEOC’s only LGBTQ commissioner, Chai Feldblum, because her existence is a "threat to marriage."

This is a real blow to American workers, especially those who are disabled. Feldblum, an Obama appointee who was re-nominated by President Trump, has spent most of her time on the Commission championing the rights of the disabled in the workplace.

In her capacity as an EEOC commissioner, she has little to nothing to do with any laws or policies having to do with marriage. So when it comes down to it Senator Lee doesn't like her because she is a lesbian.

Meanwhile, this will leave the EEOC without a quorum in 2019, making it more difficult for the agency to conduct business.

In my opinion, Sen. Lee is abusing his power as a member of the U.S. Senate. To block a Trump-appointee who has a long track record of being a strong advocate for workers in general and the disabled in particular based on nothing more than one’s personal religious preference is misguided and harmful to an extremely important federal agency.

I don't think anyone should be very happy about it.

Read the entire story here.

California Considering Ban on Employer Forced Arbitration


Last year, a bipartisan coalition in the United States Senate sponsored legislation to ban the use of mandatory arbitration agreements with regard to claims of sexual harassment and sex discrimination. The federal bill is still pending. 

Now, a similar bill has been filed in the California legislature. If it passes, the California bill would prohibit employers from requiring mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. And unlike the federal bill mentioned above, the California bill would prohibit arbitration clauses as a condition of employment as to all types of employment claims—not just sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims.

If passed, the California law would be an important start to a movement to get rid of employer-based, forced arbitration. Statistics show that arbitration is unfair to employees and is used by some employers to effectively opt out of the judicial system into a rigged, pseudo-court where wrongdoing can be effectively covered up by companies. 

And claims that arbitrating claims is more cost-effective than traditional adjudication in court are are not supported by the available statistical data. Many employment corporate defense lawyers point out that research shows arbitration is neither faster nor less expensive than litigation

There has long been data showing that a solid majority of Americans oppose forced arbitration in the employment context.  If this bill passes and becomes law in California, perhaps it will be the beginning of a nation-wide movement to allow employees back into the courtroom. 


Read More: National Law Review

Tort Reform Is A Lie: Hot Coffee Still Being Used to Mislead

Here's the lie:

The lies used to support corporate efforts to continue to restrict regular people's access to the courthouse are powerful. And, sadly, they work. Routinely, potential clients who are sitting in my office will reference the famous McDonalds "Hot Coffee" case and try to assure me that their case isn't like the Hot Coffee case.  Their case is real. 

Here's the thing, the story everyone knows about the Hot Coffee case is a myth. It's a lie pushed by big business and their tort "reform" groups to poison the minds of potential jurors and make it harder for those who have been legitimately injured to received fair compensation. 

So, What Happened?:

In 1992, 79-year-old Stella Liebeck bought a cup of takeout coffee at a McDonald’s drive-thru in Albuquerque and spilled it on her lap. She sued McDonald’s and a jury awarded her nearly $3 million in punitive damages for the burns she suffered.

Before you hear all the facts, your initial reaction might be "Isn’t coffee supposed to be hot?" or "McDonald’s didn’t pour the coffee on her, she spilled it on herself!" But that would be before you hear all the facts.

Here are the facts:

Mrs. Liebeck was not driving when her coffee spilled, nor was the car she was in moving. She was the passenger in a car that was stopped in the parking lot of the McDonald’s where she bought the coffee. She had the cup between her knees while removing the lid to add cream and sugar when the cup tipped over and spilled the entire contents on her lap.

The coffee was not just “hot.” It was very dangerously hot. McDonald’s policy was to serve it at an extremely hot temperature that could cause serious burns in seconds. Mrs. Liebeck’s injuries were far from minor. She was wearing sweatpants that absorbed the coffee and kept it against her skin. She suffered third-degree burns (the most serious kind) and required skin grafts on her inner thighs and elsewhere. (See the video above for pictures.)

Importantly Mrs. Liebeck’s case was far from an isolated event. McDonald’s had received more than 700 previous reports of injury from its coffee, including reports of third-degree burns, and had paid settlements in some cases.

Mrs. Liebeck offered to settle the case for $20,000 to cover her medical expenses and lost income. But McDonald’s never offered more than $800, so the case went to trial. The jury found Mrs. Liebeck to be partially at fault for her injuries, reducing the compensation for her injuries accordingly.

But the jury’s punitive damages award made headlines — upset by McDonald’s unwillingness to correct a policy despite hundreds of people suffering injuries, they awarded Liebeck the equivalent of two days’ worth of revenue from coffee sales for the restaurant chain. Two days. That wasn’t, however, the end of it. The original punitive damage award was ultimately reduced by more than 80 percent by the judge. And, to avoid what likely would have been years of appeals, Mrs. Liebeck and McDonald’s later reached a confidential settlement for even less than that.

Here is just some of the evidence the jury heard during the trial:  

  • McDonald’s operations manual required the franchisee to hold its coffee at 180 to 190 degrees Fahrenheit.
  • Coffee at that temperature, if spilled, causes third-degree burns in three to seven seconds.
  • The chairman of the department of mechanical engineering and biomechanical engineering at the University of Texas testified that this risk of harm is unacceptable, as did a widely recognized expert on burns, the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Burn Care and Rehabilitation, the leading scholarly publication in the specialty.
  • McDonald’s admitted it had known about the risk of serious burns from its scalding hot coffee for more than 10 years. The risk had repeatedly been brought to its attention through numerous other claims and suits.
  • An expert witness for the company testified that the number of burns was insignificant compared to the billions of cups of coffee the company served each year.
  • At least one juror later told the Wall Street Journal she thought the company wasn’t taking the injuries seriously. To the corporate restaurant giant those 700 injury cases caused by hot coffee seemed relatively rare compared to the millions of cups of coffee served. But, the juror noted, “there was a person behind every number and I don’t think the corporation was attaching enough importance to that.”
  • McDonald’s quality assurance manager testified that McDonald’s coffee, at the temperature at which it was poured into Styrofoam cups, was not fit for consumption because it would burn the mouth and throat.
  • McDonald’s admitted at trial that consumers were unaware of the extent of the risk of serious burns from spilled coffee served at McDonald’s then-required temperature.
  • McDonald’s admitted it did not warn customers of the nature and extent of this risk and could offer no explanation as to why it did not.

After the verdict, one of the jurors said over the course of the trial he came to realize the case was about “callous disregard for the safety of the people.” Another juror said “the facts were so overwhelmingly against the company.”

That’s because those jurors were able to hear all the facts — including those presented by McDonald’s — and see the extent of Mrs. Liebeck’s injuries.

But that's not the story that the public has heard. Tort reform advocates lied about the facts of the case and the fake story gained traction. It went viral. So viral that now this story is what is most often cited by jurors and others when explaining why they don't trust lawyers, why they don't like lawsuits, and why they think plaintiffs are just out for a quick buck. 

And it's all a lie.



If you want to read more, start here.

Does Judge Gorsuch Really Love the Jury Trial?

National Employment Lawyers Association Opposes Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Supreme Court


In our current environment of a new scandal every five minutes, it is easy for really important issues to get lost in all the noise.  One such big issue currently pending is the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Some oppose Gorsuch's nomination not for anything he has said or done himself, but because of the hotly contested and partisan manner in which his potential seat on the Court was arguably stolen from an equally qualified candidate by certain members of Congress last year. I personally think it was a big mistake for the republicans to inject even more partisan politics into the manner in which Supreme Court justices are selected. In our system of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court's power comes solely from its credibility with the American people. The more partisan the Court looks, the weaker it becomes.  Regardless of one's position on the issues the Court decides, it is in all of our interests for the Court to be respected and considered to be above politics to the greatest degree possible. 

Putting that issue aside for the moment, organizations that typically vet Supreme Court candidates are starting to come in with their assessments of him on issues that are important to said organizations' memberships.  This week the National Employment Lawyers Association announced their opposition to Mr. Gorsuch. NELA is the largest organization of U.S. attorneys who primarily represent employees. 

NELA's letter in opposition to Mr. Gorsuch, the text of which I include in full below, gives several reasons for the organization's opposition to his appointment. However, the most important reason listed, to my mind, is Mr. Gorsuch's reported antipathy for the jury trial...at least in employment cases. 

There have been several news reports over the course of the preceding few weeks touting Mr. Gorsuch's love of the jury trial and his plan to bring it back. Others have discussed Gorsuch's antipathy for the McDonnell-Douglass burden shifting framework in employment cases (an optional but usually-used framework for analyzing employment-related claims frequently used by judges to dismiss discrimination and harassment cases without a trial). On the surface both of these positions seem to align with the interests of employees. I hope that Gorsuch's statements regarding these issues are genuine and would support his efforts in this regard. 

But what NELA points out is that Judge Gorsuch, like many federal judges, has gotten into the bad habit of doing the jury's work for them in far to many cases. Rather than denying motions for summary judgment whenever there is a fact question at issue to be decided by a jury, he all to often weighs the evidence, draws inferences against the employee, and decides the credibility of the witnesses in the case -- all issues that are supposed to be left to the wisdom of the jury. 

Judge Gorsuch is, sadly, not unique in these reported failings. Federal judges overstepping their Constitutional role in employment cases to make improper fact determinations is a well-known problem throughout the country. (Read: "When it comes to employment cases, judges are killing the Civil Rights Act of 1964" by Judge Richard Kopf as well as "Anti-Discrimination Laws Have Been "Gutted"" on this blog.) It is a serious problem that threatens one of the most sacred elements of the American system -- the Constitutional right to a trial by jury. 

The following is the full text of NELA's letter in opposition to Judge Gorsuch's nomination: 

March 13, 2017
Submitted Via Email:
The Honorable Chuck Grassley, Chairman
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
224 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
152 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Chairman Grassley and Ranking Member Feinstein:
On behalf of the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), and its 4,000 circuit, state, and local affiliate members across the country, I write to express our strong opposition to the nomination of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch to the United States Supreme Court.
NELA is the largest professional membership organization in the country comprising lawyers who represent workers in labor, employment and civil rights disputes. Founded in 1985, NELA advances employee rights and serves lawyers who advocate for equality and justice in the American workplace. Our members litigate daily in every circuit, affording NELA a unique perspective on how employment cases actually play out on the ground. NELA strives to protect the rights of its members’ clients, and envisions a workplace in which employees will be paid at least a living wage in an environment free of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and capricious employment decisions; employees’ safety and livelihood will not be compromised for the sake of corporate profit and interests; and individuals will have effective legal representation to enforce their rights to a fair and just workplace, adequate remedies, and a right to trial by jury.
As a member of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Gorsuch has demonstrated a troubling propensity to both draw inferences against plaintiff-employees and make improper determinations regarding the credibility of the respective parties when deciding whether an employee should be permitted to present her claims to a jury (the procedural posture in most employment cases on appeal). This practice runs afoul of the applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rulings from the Supreme Court. Judge Gorsuch has shown an affinity for deploying legal reasoning unsupported by the text and purposes of the particular employment laws at issue, and adopting inappropriately narrow readings of both the facts and law in ways that operate to the detriment of employees seeking to vindicate their statutory rights. This pattern gives rise to the question of whether Judge Gorsuch places the interests of employers over the rights of employees, which should be fully explored during his confirmation hearing.
Judge Gorsuch’s tendencies as described above are made more troubling by his much-discussed skepticism regarding the doctrine of Chevron1 deference. Administrative regulations, as well as other interpretations and enforcement guidance from administrative agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) provide invaluable guidance to employers and employees regarding the nature of their rights and responsibilities, and are an essential tool for judges and advocates in resolving employment disputes. One can imagine many ways in which a Supreme Court Justice with Judge Gorsuch’s apparent tendencies regarding employment cases, further unencumbered by any responsibility to defer to authoritative interpretations developed by the agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing our workplace laws, could undermine profoundly the effective enforcement of the employment laws passed by Congress.
The case descriptions that follow constitute representative examples of the ways in which Judge Gorsuch’s jurisprudence in employment cases has manifested itself in cases arising under a number of different employment statutes.
A. Hwang v. Kansas State Univ.2 (Disability Discrimination)
After she was diagnosed with cancer, Professor Grace Hwang requested and received a six-month leave of absence covering the fall semester to recover from a bone marrow transplant. As she was preparing to return to teaching the following January, a flu outbreak erupted on campus. Because her doctor advised her not to subject her compromised immune system to such an environment, she sought further leave, during which she could have worked from home. This request contravened the employer’s rule capping all leave requests to a maximum of six months.
Judge Gorsuch ruled that Professor Hwang’s request for an additional leave of absence was unreasonable and affirmed the dismissal of her case. Applicable law requires that requests for accommodations be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett 3, the Supreme Court suggested that a reasonable accommodation may require an employer to modify an otherwise neutral rule (such as this employer’s six-month cap on leave). Judge Gorsuch’s reasoning also contravened EEOC Enforcement Guidance, and conflicted with rulings from numerous other Circuit Courts of Appeals.
B. Roberts v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.4 (Age Discrimination)
In affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer in this case, Judge Gorsuch demonstrated a number of troubling propensities that employee rights advocates understand all too well: he both drew inferences against the non-moving party and improperly weighed the evidence in a manner that Supreme Court law requires be done by a jury.
In a text message conversation, two of the defendants’ human resources employees were quoted as referencing the plaintiff’s “shelf life” in deciding whether to eliminate his position (they subsequently did). In deciding that the phrase could not constitute direct evidence of discrimination, Judge Gorsuch concluded that “the instant message conversation unmistakably suggests that ‘shelf life’ was nothing worse than an inartful reference to Mr. Roberts’s queue of billable work.”
He then moved to the question of whether the phrase, in conjunction with conflicting evidence regarding the plaintiff’s performance record, could demonstrate that the defendant’s alleged reasons for firing the plaintiff were a pretext for age discrimination. Judge Gorsuch held that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that changes in his performance reviews were a pretext for discrimination unless he could “advance evidence that IBM’s changed evaluation of his performance, whether wise or mistaken, wasn’t honestly arrived at.”
The only way in which Judge Gorsuch could reach such conclusions about the meaning of statements such as “shelf life” and the credibility of the defendant’s asserted reasons for terminating the plaintiff was by drawing a series of inferences in the defendant’s favor, and by avoiding a more common interpretation of the phrase “shelf life” when applied in conversation to an older employee. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent holds that judges must avoid drawing such inferences when deciding whether a case should be dismissed or proceed to trial.5
C. TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board 6 (Whistleblower Retaliation)
Alphonse Maddin worked as a truck driver for the defendant-employer. He was driving a tractor-trailer down an Illinois freeway on a subzero night in 2009 when he noticed that his truck was nearly out of gas. He pulled over because he could not find a fuel station, and ten minutes later, the trailer’s brakes locked up due to the frigid temperatures. Mr. Maddin was unable to resume driving the tractor-trailer and reported the truck’s unsafe condition to a dispatcher. The dispatcher told Mr. Maddin that a repairperson would be sent to fix the brakes.
Mr. Maddin dozed off briefly and awoke to find that his torso was numb and he could not feel his feet. He told the dispatcher about his physical condition and asked when the repairperson would arrive. “[H]ang in there,” the dispatcher responded.
Approximately one half hour later, Mr. Maddin called his supervisor, Larry Cluck, and told Mr. Cluck that his feet were going numb and that he was having difficulty breathing. Mr. Cluck told Mr. Maddin not to leave the trailer and gave him two options: drag the trailer with inoperable brakes, or stay put until the repairperson arrives. Mr. Maddin knew that dragging the trailer was illegal, but concluded that he might not live much longer if he were to wait for a repairperson. Consequently, Mr. Maddin unhitched the trailer and drove off.
Fifteen minutes after Mr. Maddin left—more than three hours after he first notified TransAm that he was stranded in subzero temperatures—the repairperson arrived. Mr. Maddin drove the truck back to meet the repairperson, who then fixed the trailer’s brakes. Less than a week later, TransAm terminated Mr. Maddin for abandoning the trailer. Mr. Maddin filed suit, as the applicable law prohibits an employer from firing an employee who “refuses to operate a vehicle because . . . the employee has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to the employee or the public because of the vehicle’s hazardous safety or security condition.”
An Administrative Law Judge, a panel of the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board (ARB), and a majority of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel that reviewed this case agreed that Mr. Maddin had engaged in protected activity and was retaliated against. Judge Gorsuch, however, dissented, and went out of his way to disregard the ARB’s statutory interpretation, adopt an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the term “operate” to conclude that Mr. Maddin had not engaged in protected activity, and belittle the applicable statute’s health and safety goals as “vague and generic.”
D. Strickland v. UPS, Inc.7 (Retaliation Under the Family and Medical Leave Act and Gender Discrimination)
In this case, the plaintiff was subjected to intense and unwarranted scrutiny of her performance after returning from a protected and approved two-week leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. She was required to attend additional meetings that took her away from her responsibilities, was required to commit to unrealistic performance goals, and was prevented from raising concerns regarding her treatment in line with applicable company policy. Multiple co-workers testified that the plaintiff was treated differently than her all of her co-workers after her return from leave. The treatment worsened to the point where the plaintiff left the company, though she never officially quit and it was unclear whether she intended to return to work.
A majority of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claims (as applied to her retaliation claim), as there was conflicting evidence as to whether the plaintiff intended to return to work. The panel also reversed the district court on the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims, finding that there was evidence that she was treated worse than her male co-workers.
Judge Gorsuch dissented, and would have affirmed the district court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim. Despite the evidence presented that indicated that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than her male co-workers, Judge Gorsuch concluded that the supervisor in question treated both male and female employees poorly. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Gorsuch disregarded evidence from a male co-worker that he was not subjected to the same scrutiny as the plaintiff, despite trailing her in all relevant sales categories. He also relied in part on evidence that another female employee did not also face differential treatment, despite applicable law holding that the fact that the defendant does not discriminate against every employee of the plaintiff’s protected class is no defense to a discrimination claim.
E. Weeks v. Kansas8 (Retaliation)
Judge Gorsuch held that in-house counsel did not engage in protected opposition to alleged unlawful discrimination when she advised a fire marshal to take seriously an employee’s complaints of discrimination, and he affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
This ruling is problematic for its adoption of an exception to existing anti-retaliation laws. This judge-created exception is not included in the text or supported by the purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Pursuant to his approach, employees in positions that require them to monitor an employer’s compliance with the law (such as in-house counsel) must engage in special forms of opposition or participation activity to demonstrate that they have taken a position truly “adverse to their employer.” Absent proof of this higher level of opposition, employees who hold positions such as that of a general counsel, who in many cases will be the employee best equipped to learn about and oppose unlawful workplace discrimination, are not protected against subsequent retaliation.
In affirming summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s case before trial, Judge Gorsuch also refused to resolve the question of whether the exception at issue conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty.,9 which suggested that all one must do to “oppose” unlawful workplace behavior and be protected against retaliation is to “antagonize ...; contend against; ... confront; resist; [or] withstand” it. Judge Gorsuch did so because the plaintiff failed to cite Crawford in her briefs, even though that fact does not prevent a judge from resolving an apparent conflict with binding Supreme Court precedent.
Employees who have been treated unlawfully in the workplace deserve a full and fair opportunity to prove their claims in our federal courts. Reasoning of the type found in many of Judge Gorsuch’s opinions undermines workers’ ability to vindicate their rights and undercuts the promise of a fair and just American workplace that is embodied by the employment statutes enacted by Congress. Judge Gorsuch’s treatment of both the law and facts in the cases cited above, and in others that we reviewed, suggests an ideological perspective which is unsympathetic to workers and too solicitous of employers, and belies his reputation as a committed textualist. As such, we respectfully urge you to oppose Judge Neil M. Gorsuch’s confirmation to the United States Supreme Court.

Terisa E. Chaw
Executive Director

Read More: ScotusBlog Profile of Gorsuch - Natural Successor to Scalia